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RECENT DECISIONS
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW-RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-
DAMAGES FOR BREACH ALLOWED
The defendants allegedly conspired to breach a contract restricting alienation
of certain real property to persons of the Negro race. Joined as defendants were the
grantor (a Caucasian), his mesne grantee (also a Caucasian who was financially
unsound), and the ultimate grantee (a Negro). The plaintiff's prayer was for
cancellation of the deeds and for damages for conspiracy to breach the contract.
HELD: Judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants is unconstitutional but
to award damages for their breach is not. Correll v. Earley, . . Okl...., 237
P 2d 1017 (1951).
In 1948 the Supreme Court of the United States held that State judicial
enforcement of racial restrictive covenants was "State action" violative of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kracmer
(McGhee v. Sipes), 334 U. S. 1 (1948). The court also held in a companion
decision that judicial enforcement of similar racial covenants in the Federal courts
was prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. (The actual basis of the decision was
upon Federal statute and public policy.) Civil Rights Act 16 Stat. 140 (1870),
8 U. S. C. Sec. 42 (1946); Hurd v. Hodge (Urciolo v. Hodge), 334 U. S. 24
(1948).
Both the Shelley and Hurd cases clearly point out the important distinction
between State imposed restrictions upon the use of private property which are
constitutional when reasonably related to the common welfare and State imposed
restrictions aimed at the individual user of private property which are unconsti-
tutional when based upon race or color alone. Compare Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 395 (1926), with Shelley v. Kraemer, supra;
See Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law Sec. 246 (1939). The Shelley and Hurd
cases were actions in equity to prohibit the conveyance to a non-Caucasian or for
cancellation of the deed. Whether an award at law of damages for breach would
be unconstitutional was not decided by the court. A liberal construction of the
words of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson would seem to preclude any judicial enforce-
ment of these agreements by State courts:
"We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing
alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to peti-
tioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of these
agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would
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appear dear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions
of the Amendment have not been violated." Shelley v. Kraemer, supra
p. 13. (Italics supplied).
In considering whether damages for breach of racial covenants is consti-tutional, it should be noted that although the Supreme Court has been explicit toindicate that such agreements are not in themselves invalid, Corrigan v. Buckley,271 U. S. 323 (1926); it ignored the terms of the covenant in the Hurd case
which prescribed damages as a penalty for its breach.
Since 1948 the State courts have unanimously refused to decree specificperformance of racial covenants. Earley v. Baughman, 200 Old 649, 199 P. 2d210 (1948); Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal. 703, 204 P. 2d 7 (1949); Woytus v.Winkler, 357 Mo. 1082, 212 S. W. 2d 411 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N. Y.-590, 81 N. E. 2d 325 (1948); Rich v. Jones, 142 N. J. Eq. 215, 59 A. 2d 839(1948). This is so whether the action is directed against the Caucasian grantor
or the non-Caucasian grantee. Tovey v. Levy, 401 IIL 393, 82 N. B. 2d 411
(1948).
The tendency has been to give a liberal interpretation to the language of theShelley case and to extend the scope of its impact to preclude all judicial action by
the States. A person imprisoned for contempt for refusal to comply with aninjunction against his occupancy of restricted property will be released on habeas
corpus. In Ex Parte Laws, 31 Cal. 846, 193 P. 2d 744 (1948). Judicial recog-
nition of a racial covenant as a defense in an action to try tide will be denied.
Clifton v. Puente, 218 S. W. 2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). A declaratory judg-
ment on the validity of a racial covenant will not be granted. Claremont Improve-
ment Club Inc. v. Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P. 2d 47 (1948). Thesedecisions indicate the general reluctance of State courts to affirmatively recognize
racial covenants.
Only three States since 1948 have directly considered whether an action atlaw for damages is constitutional. In Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W.2d 127 (1949), the petition was for injunctive relief or in the alternative fordamages for breach. The Circuit Court dismissed the entire action but on appeal
the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed damages against the Caucasian grantor
only, on the ground (1) that a racial covenant is a valid contract, and (2) that to
allow an action for damages for its breach was not judicial enforcement of the
covenant. (The court dismissed without comment the plaintiff's action for dam-
ages for conspiracy to breach the agreement. Brief of the Appellants, p. 18-20.)
The Oklahoma Supreme court in the instant case allowed recovery for conspiracy
on substantially the same grounds. However, the Federal District Court for theDistrict of Columbia in Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C. 1950) denied
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recovery in an action for damages on the ground that the scope of the Hurd and
Shelley decisions preclude any judicial action regardless of the form of remedy
sought. This case may be distinguished from the rulings of Missouri and Okla-
homa since the power of the Federal courts to enforce the terms of private agree-
ments is always exercised subject to the limitations of the public policy of the
Federal Government. Muschany v. United States, 324 U. S. 49, 66 (1945).
On all issues of racial character this policy is well defined. See Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 203-4 (1944). As the Roberts case indicates,
Federal public policy prohibits any Federal judicial action concerning racial
covenants.
Each State is free within the framework of its Constitution, laws and decisions
to determine its own public policy. If an award of damages by a State court for
breach of a racial covenant is not unconstitutional, then each State would be free
to allow recovery unless their public policy is contrary. Two lower court decisions
in New York prior to 1948 held that racial covenants do not offend the public
policy of the State of New York. Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Dury v. Neely, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
For the public policy of other States see Note, 3 Baylor L. Rev. 584, 587 (1951);
Comment (on Michigan public policy), 12 U. Der. I. J. 81 (1949).
The philosophy of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized that
equality and freedom in the enjoyment of private property rights is an essential
pre-requisite to the realization of the other fundamental rights of man. Slaughter-
House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 70, 81 (1873). These rights are guaranteed to the
individual regardless of race or color or creed. Oyama v. California, 332 U. S.
633 (1948). Although the Amendment does not protect the individual from
purely private discrimination, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883); it does
prohibit discrimination when such action can fairly be said to be that of the State.
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra p. 13. State imposed restrictions based upon race or
color which limit the right of a Caucasian vendor to freely convey his property
deprives him of property without due process of law. Buchaman v. Warley, 245
U. S. 60 (1917); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927). Similarly, State
imposed restrictions based solely upon the grounds of race or color which limit
the right of a non-Caucasian to freely acquire property deprive him of the equal
protection of the law. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); City of Richmond v.
Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930); Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Old. 421, 52 P. 2d
1054 (1936). Although these cases represent "State action" in its legislative form,
the same principles apply to a denial by State judicial action. The concept of
"State action" has expanded vigorously since the era of the Civil Rights Cases,
supra. Judicial action in any form is "State action" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 680 (1930); Barnett,
What is 'State Action' Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
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ments, 24 Ore. L Rev. 227 (1945); Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law Sec. 227
(1939). An award of a money judgment constituted "State action" in Old Wayne
Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 23 (1907). The Supreme
Court will determine for itself whether the act complained of is "State action" for
purposes of the Constitution and will nor be bound by the characterization
resorted to by the State courts. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 278 (1913).
Most legal commentators after the Shelley case who speculated as to the
possibility of an action being allowed for damages concluded that this remedy was
also foreclosed. Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values
Versus Human Values, 24 Notre Dame Law, 155, 182 (1949); Ming, Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment; The Restrictive Covenant Cases,
16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 217 (1948); Crooks, Racial Covenant Cases, 37 Geo. L. J.
514, 525 (1949); Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. Rev.
508, 527.
The coercive power of the State alone, standing behind racial covenants,
indirectly effectuates the discriminatory purposes of these agreements. A judgment
for damages is simultaneously a State authorized sanction against willing vendors
for their refusal to voluntarily adhere to the terms of the covenant and a deterrant
upon other willing vendors which hinders the right of non-Caucasians to freely
acquire property. A racially discriminatory covenant, as a matter of constitutional
law, should be treated as valid, but unenforceable in any manner by State courts.
Maynard C. Schaus, Jr.
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS-ACCUMULATIONS-CHOICE OF LAW
Testatrix died in 1940, domiciled in California. By her will she established
a trust for the benefit of her son. The trustees were directed: "To pay one-quarter
of the net income thereof to or for the benefit of (the) son, until he shall have
attained the age of thirty years, and upon his attaining the age of thirty years to
pay one-half of the net income to or for the benefit of (the) said son until he
shall attain the age of forty-five years, and upon his attaining the age of forty-five
years to pay the principal of said trust fund together with accumulated income
thereon to (the) said son." The California court transferred the property to New
York state where the beneficiary resided. The son having attained his majority
demanded that the trustees pay over to him the entire accumulated income of the
trust and annually pay him the future income. The Surrogate directed them to do
so; holding that the provisions for accumulation of income beyond the minority
of the beneficiary, though valid in California, were illegal in New York and that
he was not required to substitute the policy and laws of a foreign state for those
